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Dynamic Internal Control Performance over Financial Reporting 
and External Financing 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper, we present a theoretical model and empirical evidence on the effects of 
dynamic internal control performance on external financing choices of a company.  
Using  both within-sample and difference-in-difference analysis, we find that after 
issuing internal control weakness (i.e. ICW) reports under SOX 404,  the ICW 
companies rely more on debt financing and less on equity financing than in previous 
periods.  This effect is more pronounced for the companies with low ex ante 
probability of internal control weakness.  In addition, we show that after correcting 
the previously reported ICWs, these ICW companies rely more on equity as opposed 
to debt financing.  This result is more pronounced for smaller companies.  Our 
findings suggest that increased (decreased) information asymmetry induced by 
ineffective (effective) internal control over financial reporting leads a company to 
follow specific external financing choices to meet its financial deficits.  
 
Key Words: Internal Control Weakness, Financial Reporting Quality, External 
Financing 
Data availability: All data are available from sources identified in the paper. 
JEL codes: G32, M40   
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“Good internal control is one of the most effective deterrents to fraud, and therefore 
we expect to help protect investors from the kinds of financial reporting scandals that 
the [Sarbanes-Oxley Act] seeks to prevent.” 
William McDonough, Former Chairman of PCAOB (2003-2005) 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Capital markets operate on the principle that companies present reliable and 
complete financial data to investors who make investment decisions, in order that the 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders can be mitigated.  Good 
internal control over financial reporting1 can mitigate information asymmetry and 
help achieve a high quality of financial reporting (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Chin 
and Weng, 2010).  The theoretical literature has recognized that information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders affects the financing choices of a company.  
For example, in cases where information is limited, outsiders require a higher 
premium to compensate for the risk of investing in a company with potentially poor 
prospects (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Greenwald et al., 1984; Graham and Harvey, 
2001).  The literature on the relationship between the quality of financial reporting 
and external financing takes either a purely cross-sectional approach  (e.g. Chang et 
al., 2009) or a two-period time-series approach (e.g. Chen et al., 2012). Our paper 
uses a three-period scenario to extend the literature by examining how internal control 
over financial reporting affects the external financing choices of a company.   
First, we develop a model to consider the relationship between the differences 
in internal control over financial reporting and security issuance.  The assumption of 
                                                        
1 In this paper we use “internal control over financial reporting” and “internal control” interchangeably. 
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our model is that good internal control over financial reporting can reduce information 
asymmetry about future earnings of the company (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Chin 
and Weng, 2010).  Our model proposes that adverse selection in capital markets 
makes companies with internal control weaknesses in financial reporting (ICW 
hereafter)2 rely more on debt as opposed to equity than the companies with no internal 
control weaknesses.  
In our empirical tests, we use the Sarbanes-Oxley internal control reports 
under Section 404 to measure internal control performance and examine whether 
internal control reporting affects the external financing choice of a company.  
Specifically, we compare the likelihood of issuing equity to meet financial deficits 
between three periods - the period prior to an initial ICW reporting (pre-ICW period), 
the period of ICWs that are uncorrected (uncorrected period), and the period of the 
previously disclosed ICWs that are corrected (corrected period) (Costello and 
Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011).   
Using both within-sample and difference-in-difference tests, our empirical 
results are in line with the predictions in the model.  First, ICW companies are less 
likely to issue equity in the uncorrected period.  This result is more pronounced for 
companies with low ex ante probability of internal control weaknesses.  Second, after 
remedying previously disclosed ICWs, these ICW companies are more likely to issue 
equity in the corrected period.  This result is more pronounced for the small 
companies.   
Alternatively, it is possible that the relationship between internal control 
performance and external financing decision is not the result of information 
                                                        
2 In this paper we use “ICW” to represent “internal control weakness (in financial reporting)”.  ICW 
companies refer to companies that incur ICWs. 
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asymmetry, but arise from the fact that managers rely on accounting systems to make 
investment decisions and thus external financing choices are affected accordingly. We 
mitigate this concern by controlling for investment level in the regressions and our 
conclusions do not change after conducting several other robustness checks.   
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways.  First, our study, by 
considering the cost of issuing debt and equity together, investigates the effects of 
internal control over financial reporting on companies’ external financing decisions.  
Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2009) find a positive relationship between the cost of equity 
and internal control weakness.  Previous literature also shows that when a company 
experiences an internal control weakness, lenders charge a higher interest rate on debt 
(Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Kim et al., 2011).  
From the above studies, we recognize that players in both equity and debt markets are 
effectively “delegated monitors”, but the net effect of the increased cost of debt over 
the cost of equity from ICWs is still unknown.  Our paper, by analyzing how internal 
control over financial reporting affects the external financing choices of a company, 
allows us to compare the cost of debt relative to the cost of equity rather than to 
merely evaluate the absolute cost of debt or cost of equity. 
Second, our paper examines not only the initial ICW disclosure, but also the 
remediation of ICWs that affect companies’ external financing choices.  Recently an 
emerging stream of research examines how investors respond to the remediation of 
previously disclosed ICWs (e.g. Feng et al. 2009; Johnstone et al. 2010; Kim et al., 
2011; Li et al. 2010; Munsif et al, 2011; Yu, 2011; Hammersley et al. 2012), but there 
is limited research on whether the dynamic effect of internal control over financial 
reporting affects the way ICW companies make corporate decisions, e.g. external 
financing choices.  Our study shows that ICW companies are more likely to issue 
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equity after they correct previously disclosed ICWs.  This association is more 
pronounced for small companies that rely more on equity financing to meet financial 
deficits (Frank and Goyal, 2003).  Therefore, in the context of external financing 
decisions, our paper shows that the implementation of SOX can restore investor 
confidence in the quality of financial reporting by mitigating information asymmetry 
and adverse selection in the capital market. 
Third, our paper complements the literature on the adverse effects of financial 
restatements on external financing (Chen et al., 2012).    Our methodology involves 
using internal control reports instead of restatements, and this has four main 
advantages. First, most of the financial restatements are voluntary and initiated by 
companies.  Internal control reporting is mandatory for the managers who are 
responsible for assessing the internal control performance and reporting it to the 
public. Thus, by using dynamic ICW reporting, we may mitigate the selection bias 
associated with the decision of managers in reporting financial restatements (Dechow 
et al., 2010).  Second, financial restatements can be less timely in cases where 
managers revisit their financial numbers after a few years3 (Plumlee and Yohn, 2010).  
Internal control reporting under SOX 404 is issued on an annual basis. Therefore, in 
contrast to  Chen et al. (2012) who  investigate real but less timely disclosed financial 
reporting errors, our study examines whether the earlier and more timely signals of 
potential future financial statement problems, proxied by ICW disclosure, affects 
external financing choices (Kinney and McDaniel, 1989; DeFond and Jiambalvo, 
                                                        
3 Consider the following example. On March 15, 2006, America Service Group Inc. announced that the 
Audit Committee had reached certain conclusions with respect to findings of the investigation that 
would result in a restatement of the consolidated financial results of a company for fiscal years 2001 
through 2004 and the first and second quarters of fiscal year 2005.  The restatement reduces previously 
reported net income for these periods by $2.1 million, in the aggregate, and reduces previously reported 
retained earnings as of January 1, 2001 by $347,000. 
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1991; Chan and Wang, 2006).   Third, a restatement sample only has two periods, the 
pre-restatement period and the post-restatement period (e.g., Chen et al., 2012).  
Using a restatement sample alone prevents  us from directly examining how any 
improved quality in financial reporting would affect companies that restate earnings 
to issue securities after an initial financial misreporting.  However, if we use the 
internal control performance reports, we have the pre-ICW period, the uncorrected 
period and the corrected period, and hence can examine the dynamic pattern of the 
quality of the accounting system.  The reports provide us with an opportunity to 
investigate not only the poor quality of financial reporting, but also the later improved 
quality that affects companies’ external financing choices.   Fourth, prior studies find 
that the restatement and ICW represent different characteristics of financial quality 
(Plumlee and Yohn, 2010; Hennes et al., 2008).  Financial restatements can be the 
outcome of either a weak accounting system (i.e. weak internal control procedures) or 
opportunistic earnings management.  Internal control over financial reporting, as 
direct evidence on accounting system performance, helps us to decompose these two 
effects and to examine whether the accounting system plays a role in mitigating 
information asymmetry in the capital market. 
Finally, our paper also complements Chang et al. (2009) by presenting a 
clearer picture of the relationship between companies’ external financing choices and 
dynamic financial reporting quality.  Chang et al. (2009) find that the difference in 
auditor quality affects the decision regarding financing choices of companies.   We 
have three main advantages over Chang et al. (2009) in using internal control 
performance reporting.  First, Chang et al. (2009) assume that larger auditors are more 
likely to offer higher audit quality (Willenborg, 1999; Ireland and Lennox, 2002).  
The auditor size results, however, do not identify whether detection ability, reporting 
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system, or reporting incentives affect the differences in information asymmetry 
(Dechow et al., 2010).  Internal control reporting, however, is more directly related to 
the reporting system, and in turn suffers less from these deficiencies.  Second, as 
Chang et al. (2009) discuss in their paper, auditor quality may be endogenous (i.e., the 
choice of Big-4 or non-Big-4 auditors is decided by companies).  Internal control 
reporting is mandatory for US listed companies that issue securities to the public. The 
managers who are responsible for assessing the internal control performance are 
legally bound to disclose related reports.  Given the higher litigation risk in the post-
SOX era for the managers who might be  involved in misreporting, it is believed that 
all internal control performance reports from managers would reveal the underlying 
financial reporting quality (Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011).  Third, it is rare 
and extreme for a company to change its auditor from Big-N to non-Big-N firms (low 
auditor quality), and then switch back to Big-N firms (high auditor quality) in a short 
period (DeFond and Lennox, 2011).  Therefore, in practice, we cannot use the Big-N 
auditor choices to examine the relationship between the dynamic information 
asymmetry for a company and its external financing choice.  In our study, the 
dynamic internal control performance allows us to employ both within sample and 
difference-in-difference analyses; hence we can mitigate the concern about the 
endogeneity issue and extend the literature on dynamic information asymmetry and 
external financing decisions.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 reviews the 
related literature and discusses the motivations.  Section 3 presents the model and 
develops hypotheses.  Section 4 outlines the research design.  Section 5 discusses the 
data and sample selection. Section 6 provides the empirical results and Section 7 
presents additional tests. Finally, Section 8 concludes. 
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2. Literature Review 
Our study is related to three lines of research. The first line of related research 
is the internal control weaknesses reported under SOX Sections 302 and 404.  In 
2002, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) to improve the quality 
of financial reporting and to restore investor confidence in the reliability of financial 
statements.  An important aspect of SOX is its internal control reporting requirements, 
which allow investors to be informed about the internal control quality of a company.  
Studies that examine the characteristics of ICW companies find that  these companies 
are smaller in size and underperform (Bryan and Lilien, 2005), engage in more 
earnings manipulation (Chan et al., 2005), have lower accrual quality (Doyle et al., 
2007a, b;  Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009), and pay higher audit fees (Bédard et al., 
2008).  The findings of the above studies imply that the presence of ICW reports 
indicates a lower financial quality for the reporting companies relative to the non-
ICW companies.  Effective internal controls over financial reporting should lead to 
more reliable financial statements through the prevention and detection of procedural 
and estimation errors (Doyle et al., 2007a, b; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1991).  In 
addition, the previous literature also implies that we cannot perfectly control for 
company characteristics associated with the ICWs.  Therefore, analyzing changes in 
terms of financing decisions within the sample of ICW companies is a more powerful 
research design than comparing the financing choices of ICW companies with those 
of non-ICW companies (Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011). 4 
                                                        
4 We recognize that without the control sample, it is not clear whether the results found are due to 
internal control performance reporting or driven by other significant contemporaneous economic events.  
Therefore, we also conduct difference-in-difference tests for all main research questions. 
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Our second line of related research deals with capital structure and financing 
choice of a company. Several theories of capital structure have been proposed in the 
past decades.  Opinions differ as to which theory dominates.   Most corporate finance 
textbooks point to the “tradeoff theory” (e.g. Hovakimian et al., 2001), which 
suggests that the change in the leverage ratio is related to whether the company meets 
its target debt ratio.  Myers (1984) and Myers and Majluf (1984) propose the “pecking 
order theory” in which adverse selection from information asymmetry between 
insiders and outsiders can lead companies to follow the specific financing hierarchy of 
retained earnings, debt and then equity.  Frank and Goyal (2003), however, fail to find 
strong empirical evidence on whether companies follow the pecking order theory to 
meet their financing deficits.5  Recently, the idea that companies engage in “market 
timing”, has become popular.  Equity market timing refers to the practice of issuing 
shares when stock prices are high and repurchasing shares when stock prices are low.  
Several studies in accounting and finance provide evidence supporting the market 
timing hypothesis (Baker and Wurgler, 2002; Bradshaw et al., 2006; Dennis and Sarin, 
2001; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Hovakimian, 2006; Kayhan and Titman, 2007).  We 
contend that pecking order or market timing may not be primary motives or criteria 
for external financing choices, though  both of these theories assume that information 
asymmetry between management and investors with respect to corporate 
fundamentals systemically influences equity or debt issuance decisions.6  Naturally, 
capital markets operate on the principle that companies should present reliable and 
                                                        
5 Leary et al. (2010) find that because of improper classification of equity and debt financing in prior 
empirical literature, weak evidence on pecking order theory in the data is driven more by incentive 
conflicts, as opposed to information asymmetry. 
6  Other than information asymmetry, we recognize that companies do equity financing when they face 
lower adverse selection costs, which occur in periods with more promising investment opportunities 
and with less uncertainty about assets in place (Chang et al., 2006, 2009). 
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complete financial data for making investment decisions, in order that the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders can be mitigated.  Hence, the question is 
whether the quality of financial reporting affects capital structure and external 
financing. 
Our third line of related research examines the relationship between financial 
reporting quality and external financing.  The basic conjecture in this line of research 
is that a lower credibility regarding financial reporting causes an increase in 
information asymmetry between insiders and outsiders and induces severe 
reputational and economic losses on these companies (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; 
Chin and Weng, 2010).  These increased costs in equity financing lead to financial 
constraints and more debt financing.  Chen et al. (2012) find that companies with 
financial restatements are less likely to obtain external financing and rely more on 
debt financing.  Chang et al. (2009) show that companies audited by the Big-6 
accounting firms are more likely to issue equity as opposed to debt.   This suggests 
that the Big-6 auditors play a role in mitigating information asymmetry in the capital 
market.  Our study, by highlighting the dynamic effect of internal control system, 
investigates not only the poor quality of financial reporting, but also the future 
improved quality that affects companies’ external financing choices. 
 
3. Theoretical Model and Hypothesis Development 
In this section, we develop our hypotheses based on a theoretical model.  Our 
model is built upon Choe et al. (1993), Dittmar et al. (2007), and Chang et al. (2009).7 
                                                        
7Unlike Chang et al. (2009), we consider the setting of ICW reporting (correction) rather than auditor 
quality.  Moreover, Dittmar et al. (2007) develop their model based on the parameter of disagreement 
between investors and managers. Reporting an ICW can be viewed as one example of expanding the 
disagreement gap between investors and managers.  All of these models, including ours, do not 
consider the dynamic investment scale. 
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The underlying idea is that internal control reporting assists investors in inferring the 
earnings quality of companies in the market.  Intuitively, when companies report 
ICWs (do not report ICWs or correct ICWs), investors will conjecture that these 
companies are more (less) likely to incur the problem in delivering reliable 
information, either because of the weak corporate governance associated with 
reporting ICWs or because ICWs hinder managers from making sound decisions. 
Overall, these two effects will exacerbate each other and lead to information 
asymmetry between investors and managers.  ICW companies with a high level of 
earnings will suffer from this information problem through the mispricing by 
investors and thus make their external financing decisions by comparing the 
mispricing costs associated with equity financing and the financial distress costs 
arising from debt financing. Other types of companies (ICW companies with low-
level earnings and companies that do not disclose ICWs) will not suffer from the 
mispricing that arises from ICW reporting. 
 
3.1 Timeline, Information and Payoff 
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Figure 1 describes the timeline for our analysis.  At  t=1, the company operates 
on the basis of assets in place and one new project which needs the amount of 
financing I. The company will have a realized payoff of I1+Q1 if there is no shock at 
t=2 (with probability of r) and zero payoff if the shock takes place (with probability of 
1-r).  The earnings from assets in place will be either XH (with probability of r) or XL 
(with probability of 1-r), depending on the state that will be realized at t=2. However, 
13 
 
the ex ante probability of earnings being high and low is respectively p and 1-p.  
Moreover, at t=1, the ICW is not fixed.8  At t=2, the ICW is fixed and the company 
needs to finance I2 for another new project. At t=3, the payoff from the new 
investment and earnings from assets in place are realized and is similar to that in 
period t=1.   We call the period between t=1 and t=2 the “uncorrected period” and the 
one between t=2 and t=3 the “corrected period”. 
 
3.2 Internal Control Weakness (ICW) and Earnings Quality 
The market infers the quality of reported earnings by considering whether the 
company reports its ICWs or not. If the company with ICWs reports high level 
earnings at t=2, then investors will discount the earnings by one half,9 i.e., they would 
just trust the reported earnings number with probability 0.5.  This assumption is 
consistent with prior literature which finds that ICW disclosure is associated with 
lower earnings quality.  For example, Ashbaugh-Skaife et al. (2008) show that ICW 
companies have larger abnormal accruals.  Doyle et al. (2007a) also show that the 
accruals are noisier in ICW companies. Therefore, we follow the prior studies and 
assume that ICW disclosure is associated with higher information risk for outside 
investors (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2009).  Further, we assume that the company 
finances the new investment I (I1 or I2) either through the issuance of debt or equity.  
Finally, we assume that managers always act in the interest of existing shareholders in 
deciding on whether to issue debt or equity by making a trade-off between financial 
distress costs, c, and equity mispricing costs.  
 
                                                        
8 It corresponds to the uncorrected period in our empirical section. 
9 One half is just a simplifying assumption.  It could be any number that lies in the interval of (0, 1).  
The magnitude of discounting may depend on other factors, such as the severity of ICW. 
14 
 
3.3 Financing Choice between Debt and Equity 
We separately examine the effect of ICW reporting (no ICW reported) and 
ICW remediation on companies’ external financing decisions in this section along the 
timeline in Figure 1.  Specifically, we compare the differences in companies’ external 
financing decisions in both cross-sectional and time-series settings by examining 
companies’ tradeoffs between financial distress costs and mispricing costs. 
From a cross-sectional perspective, we compare the external financing 
decisions made by ICW companies with high-level earnings versus other types of 
companies. First, by assumption, if no ICW is disclosed at t=1, the company will 
always resort to equity for financing needs between t=1 and t=2.  In this case, the 
company is not mispriced.  This is because the company does not suffer information 
asymmetry arising from ICWs.  To avoid financial distress costs from debt financing 
and to fully take advantage of non-mispricing of equity, equity financing is the best 
choice for the company. 
Now suppose that an ICW is disclosed at t=1.  It may happen to companies 
with high or low-level earnings.  If concurrently low earnings are reported, investors 
will interpret the signal as true because this confirms their priors.  In this case, 
information asymmetry does not exist because the investors’ belief is consistent with 
the true state of the company.  
However, if high earnings are reported, investors will suspect the reliability of 
the earnings number reported because it is likely that companies with ICWs are 
engaged in earnings manipulation.  The high-level earnings might be due to the 
adverse selection behavior by the manager, i.e., managers may be opportunistic in 
reporting their earnings while sacrificing the interests of shareholders.  In this case, 
investors, especially shareholders, who primarily use earnings information to evaluate 
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firm value, will discount the earnings together with the disclosure of ICWs.  In 
summary, when an ICW is disclosed, investors update their belief via Bayes’ rule as 
follows: 
 
𝐸(𝑋, 𝑝) = 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑋𝐻|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼) ∗ 𝑋𝐻 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃. (𝑋 = 𝑋𝐿|𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼) ∗ 𝑋𝐿= 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑋𝐻 ,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼)
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼) ∗ 𝑋𝐻 + 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝑋 = 𝑋𝐿 ,𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃(𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑃𝐼𝑝𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝐼) ∗ 𝑋𝐿= 0.5𝑝(1 − 𝑝) + 0.5𝑝 ∗ 𝑋𝐻 + 0.5(1 − 𝑝)(1 − 𝑝) + 0.5𝑝 ∗ 𝑋𝐿(1) 
 
where E(X, p) is the expected earnings level when investors observe the 
disclosure of an ICW.  The expected earnings lie in the interval of (XL, XH), meaning 
that high earnings are undervalued while low earnings are overvalued by investors. 
Therefore, in equilibrium, companies with earnings level of XL will issue equity 
because they do not suffer from the underpricing problem.  However, we do not have 
a clear prediction as regards to the external financing decision made by companies 
with the earnings level of XH.  On the one hand, these companies incur underpricing 
costs when issuing equity, while on the other hand, they incur financial distress costs 
if debt is issued. The proof in Appendix A shows that for a company that discloses an 
ICW and has a performance level of XH, the choice between debt and equity depends 
on the investment scale.  Based on the predictions in Appendix A, we summarize the 
companies’ external financing decisions during the uncorrected period in Figure 2: 
 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
It is clearly shown that in Figure 2, the likelihood of equity financing is lower 
in the case of ICW reporting than that of no ICW reporting. We thus make the 
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following observation: 
Observation 1:  Companies with ICWs reported will issue equity (as opposed 
to debt) less frequently than will those with no ICW reported. 
In a similar vein, from a time-series perspective, in the corrected period 
between t=2 and t=3, the previously disclosed ICWs are corrected.  The company has 
no mispricing costs associated with equity issuance, while it still has financial distress 
costs associated with debt issuance, when compared to the uncorrected period.  An 
intuitive trade-off between the two makes equity more attractive as an external 
financing choice.  Therefore, if the company wants to finance I1 and its manager acts 
in the interest of existing shareholders, we have the following observation: 
Observation 2: Companies with ICW remediated will issue equity (as 
opposed to debt) more frequently than those with ICW reported. 
 
3.4 Empirical Hypotheses 
Empirically, our main research goal is to assess whether the current ICW 
disclosures and the future remediation reporting affect companies’ financing choices.  
Section 404 (a) under SOX prescribes a rigorous process for management to test and 
evaluate internal control performance and file a formal assessment report with annual 
financial reporting.  Based on the Observation 1 in our model, we have the following 
hypothesis: 
H1:  Ceteris paribus, ICW companies are more likely to use debt as opposed 
to equity in the uncorrected period. 
 Regarding ICW remediation, Yu (2011) finds that investors’ assessment of 
earnings quality, proxied by the earnings response coefficient (ERC), becomes greater 
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if companies correct previously disclosed ICWs.  This implies that equity market 
investors are aware of and react positively to the improvement of internal control over 
financial reporting.  In the debt markets, Kim et al. (2011) fail to find evidence that 
lenders continue to penalize ICW companies with higher borrowing rates, fewer 
sources of funds or required collateral even after the companies have remediated the 
previously reported ICWs.10  In  Observation 2 of our model, we propose that 
companies that correct previously disclosed ICWs will issue equity more frequently 
than those that continue to have uncorrected ICWs.  Empirically, we have the second 
hypothesis as follows: 
H2:  Ceteris paribus, ICW companies are more likely to use equity as 
opposed to debt in the corrected period. 
 
4. Research Design 
In our empirical tests, we use the Probit model in Chang et al. (2009) to 
investigate financing decision of a company during three periods -- the period prior to 
an initial ICW reporting (pre-ICW period), the period during which the ICW  remains 
uncorrected (uncorrected period), and the subsequent period when  the ICW  is 
corrected  (corrected period).  The model is as follows:  
 
P[EQFINAi,t=1]=a0 + a1UNCORRECTEDi,t + a2CORRECTEDi,t + a3 ROAi,t-1 + 
a4TANGi,t-1 + a5SIZEi,t-1 + a6ZSCOREi,t-1 + a7LEVi,t-1 + a8MBi,t-1 + 
                                                        
10 Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), however, find that lenders also continue to charge higher 
interest rate from the companies that corrected previously disclosed ICWs. They explain this evidence 
as a long-term reputation costs.  Different from Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011), Kim et al. 
(2011) employ difference-in-difference tests and do not find such long-term reputation costs imposed 
on the ICW companies. 
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a9DVi,t + a10DWCi,t + a11INVESTi,t + a12CASHi,t +  a13BIG4i,t-1 +  
a14LOGAFi,t-1 +  a15RATINGi,t-1 +  a16 STDEARNi,t-1 + a17 RVOLi,t-1 
+  a18TURNOVERi,t-1 +  a19RETi,t-1 +  a20AGEi,t-1 + εi,t   (1) 
 
where UNCORRECTED is an indicator variable equal to one if the company i 
is in  the uncorrected period, zero otherwise.  CORRECTED is an indicator variable 
equal to one if the company i is at the corrected period, zero otherwise.  Specifically, 
the uncorrected period starts at the first ICW report date and ends on the date of the 
first clean internal control report.  If the company i is in the pre-ICW period, both 
UNCORRECTED and CORRECTED are equal to zero.  As predicted in H1, we expect 
that a1 is significantly negative, suggesting that ICW companies are less likely to use 
equity relative to debt in the uncorrected period than in the pre-ICW period.  H2, 
however, predicts a2 to be significantly positive, suggesting that ICW companies are 
more likely to use equity relative to debt in the corrected period.  In addition, because 
we use panel data for all our tests throughout the paper, we calculate all standard 
errors clustered along two dimensions, company and year. 11 
In Model (1), we control for other determinants of external financing choices. 
If UNCORRECTED and CORRECTED capture the differences between the three 
periods of ICW reporting and ICW remediation, the addition of the controls should 
not significantly change our results.   To control for the relationship between 
financing choices and the different sizes of operating, investing and financing a cash 
deficit, we decompose financial deficits (DEF) into dividend payout (DV), change in 
working capital (DWC), investment (INVEST) and internal cash flow (CASH) and 
                                                        
11 We follow this procedure for all of the regression models in this paper. 
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then include these variables  in the model (Frank and Goyal, 2003)12.   Additionally, 
we include the log of the book value of assets to proxy for company size (SIZE), and 
the log of 1 plus the age of company in Compustat (AGE).  We also include share 
turnover (TURNOVER) to control for liquidity, and net PPE-to-asset ratio (TANG) to 
control for the collateral capacity to debt financing.  We use the return on assets (ROA) 
to proxy for profitability to control for debt capacity.  Under both market timing and 
adverse selection, past stock market return (RET) is positively related to equity 
financing. Finally, besides using market-to-book ratio (MB) to control for growth 
opportunities, following Chang et al., (2009), we also include Z-score (ZSCORE) 
(Altman, 1968), leverage ratio (LEV), stock return volatility (RVOL), historical 
earnings volatility (STDEARN), Big 4 auditor indicator (BIG4),  the log of one plus 
the number of analyst following (LOGAF), and debt rating indicator (RATING) 
(Faulkender and Petersen, 2006).  All of these variables are defined in Appendix B.    
Costello and Wittenberg-Moerman (2011) suggest that we cannot perfectly 
control for company characteristics associated with ICWs.  Therefore, analyzing the 
changes in financing decisions within the sample of ICW companies is a more 
powerful research design than merely comparing the financing choices of ICW 
companies with those of non-ICW companies.  However, we recognize that without a 
control sample, it is not clear whether the results found are due to internal control 
performance reporting or driven by other significant contemporaneous economic 
events.  Specifically, the results of ICW remediation and external financing choices 
for ICW companies could also be driven, at least partially, by a general regulatory 
                                                        
12 DEFi,t  is the financial deficit for company i in year t, deflated by total assets at the end of year t.  
Financial deficit for company i in year t is equal to the sum of dividend payment (DV), change in 
working capital (DWC) and investment (INVEST) for company i in year t, minus internal cash flow 
(CASH) for company i in year t.  We discuss the relationship between the size of investing and external 
financing choices in the additional analysis of Section 7.3. 
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effect of SOX. That is, SOX-mandated regulations could have improved the overall 
information environment and corporate governance of U.S. companies (Singer and 
You, 2011), and, thus, could have reduced the general information asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders. Therefore, we also conduct difference-in-difference 
tests by using the propensity score matched sample. 
The propensity score is generated from a prediction model with the dependent 
variable being ICW and the explanatory variables being determinants identified by 
previous studies (e.g. Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; Ashbaugh-Skaife 
et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007a).13 Therefore, we have the following difference-in-
difference model of financing choices: 
 
P[EQFINAi,t=1] = b0 + b1ICWi,t + b2UNCORRECTEDi,t +  b3CORRECTEDi,t  + 
b4ICWi,t*UNCORRECTEDi,t +  b5ICWi,t*CORRECTEDi,t  + b6 
Controls + εi,t     (2)  
 
where ICW is an indicator variable that is set to one if the company i has at 
least one ICW report during 2004-2009,  zero otherwise.  Definitions of the other 
variables are the same as those in Model (1). 
Under this specification, our coefficients of interest are b4 and b5.  b4 denotes 
whether the ICW companies are more likely to issue equity to meet their financial 
deficits in the uncorrected period than the control companies. H1 predicts that b4 is 
significantly negative.  b5 measures whether the ICW companies are less likely to 
issue debt to meet their financial deficits in the corrected period than the control 
companies.  H2 predicts that b5 is significantly positive.  
                                                        
13 All of variables we use in the propensity score matching procedure can be found in Appendix B.   
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5. Data and Sample Selection 
5.1 Sample Construction 
Our sample is the intersection of Compustat, CRSP and Audit Analytics. We 
show the sample selection procedure in detail in Panel A, Table 1.  Specifically, to 
ensure that our results are not driven by the internal performance changes due to 
earlier ICWs found in Section 302 before 2004, but are due to the implementation of 
Section 404 (a), we only include 2,236 companies (or 3,597 ICW report-years) that 
have no ICW reports before 2004, but have at least one ICW report from 2004 to 
2009 in the Audit Analytics database.  We further delete all companies that are not 
listed before the fiscal year 2000.14  We follow this procedure for three reasons.  First, 
in the case of the companies listed after SOX 302 or 404, we cannot document the 
internal control performance before their listings. As a result, the relationship between 
their initial equity financing and the internal control performance is not valid. Second, 
the relationship between the initial equity offerings and the subsequent first seasonal 
equity offerings is affected by various managerial incentives and firm characteristics 
(Spiess and Pettway, 1997; Harjoto and Garen, 2003; Jiang, 2008).  To control for 
these effects that may potentially influence our results, we only include companies 
that have completed their first seasonal equity financing before SOX 302.  Third, to 
increase the quality of the propensity score matching procedure, we include a 
reasonable size of observations in the pre-ICW period.   We extract the financial data 
from Compustat.  Following Chang et al. (2009), we remove observations of financial 
                                                        
14 Untabulated results show that our conclusions are not affected if we choose year 2001 or 2002 as an 
alternative cut-off. 
22 
 
companies (6000-6999)15, regulated utilities (4900-4999)16, companies with negative 
sales and companies involved in major mergers (Compustat footnote code AB) (Frank 
and Goyal, 2003).  To ensure that our results are comparable with the previous studies 
(e.g. Chang et al., 2009) and are not driven by extremely small companies, we also 
exclude observations if the total assets of a company are less than $ 5 million.17  We 
then match the financial data with ICW companies by eliminating 1,717 companies 
(or 2,792 ICW report-years) that miss the required accounting variables to construct 
financial deficit and control variables used for further empirical analysis. Therefore, 
the initial sample we use in the empirical analysis is composed of 519 ICW 
companies (or 805 ICW report-years).  Panel B of Table 1 presents the annual 
distribution of the initial sample of ICW reports.  As with the ICW sample, there is no 
obviously increasing or decreasing trend in the number of ICW reports over the 
period 2004 to 2009.   However, starting from December 15, 2007, non-accelerated 
companies are required to file annual internal control reports under SOX 404 (a).  As 
a result, in our sample, except for the fiscal year of 2005, the total number of ICW 
reports and the percentage of ICW reports decrease over time.    
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
5.2 Control Group Construction 
                                                        
15 Investment companies are registered under Section 8 of the Investment Company Act of 1940 and 
are not subject to Section 404 of SOX. 
16 Regulated companies might be subject to different reporting invectives and financing habits. 
17 Due to the loss of too many observations in our sample, we do not follow the procedure in Chang et 
al. (2009) where observations are excluded if the assets of a company are less than $10 million. Our 
results are not affected when we use $ 1 million as an alternative cut-off.  
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We first include companies with no ICW reports under Section 302 and 404 in 
the Audit Analytics database from 2002-2009 in our initial sample.  Second, we 
conduct the propensity score matching procedure to construct our control sample.  
This brings down the number of ICW companies to 519 (2,476 company-years) and 
control companies to 519 (2,476 company-years).  
 
6. Empirical results 
6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 presents the characteristics of the ICW companies.  All 
variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  The firm characteristics of 
ICW companies are consistent with the prior literature (e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 
2009). Specifically, the ICW companies have small size (SIZE) and low return on 
assets (ROA). We use this initial sample in the within sample analysis.  
Panel B of Table 2 suggests that the matching is successful.  After we choose 
the non-ICW companies that have the closest propensity scores with each ICW 
company, the matched non-ICW companies have similar characteristics as the ICW 
companies.  Specifically, all company characteristics are statistically indistinguishable 
between the two groups, except for the matched non-ICW companies which have a 
slightly lower sales growth rate (statistically significant at the ten percent level). We 
use this matched sample in the difference-in-difference analysis. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
6.2 Disaggregation of Financial Deficit and Financing Choices 
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Before we conduct the regression analysis, we disaggregate the financial 
deficit to see whether financial condition of companies change during the three 
periods:  – Pre-ICW, UNCORRECTED, and CORRECTED.  Table 3 reports the 
financial deficits and financing choices of the initial sample of ICW companies.  The 
percentage of equity financing is higher in the Pre-ICW period (65.71%) than in the 
UNCORRECTED period (35.71%).  In addition, on average, ICW companies also rely 
more on equity to meet their financial deficits in the CORRECTED period (68.97%) 
than in the UNCORRECTED period, and slightly more than they do in the Pre-ICW 
period.  This is consistent with H1 and H2.  It is interesting to observe that (1) total 
financing deficits or total external financing is least in the UNCORRECTED period 
(0.019 vs. 0.035 and 0.029); and (2) ICW companies change dramatically in 
investments (INVEST) and internal cash flow (CASH) between the three periods.  
Specially, ICW companies invest least in the UNCORRECTED period (0.048 vs. 
0.059 and 0.060), and internal cash flow (CASH) (0.053 vs. 0.039 and 0.047) in the 
CORRECTED period.  The results suggest that ICW firms may shrink their 
investments and adjust the internal funds due to the higher cost of capital, which in 
turn may affect the external financing behaviors (Fazzari, et al. 1988; Almeida and 
Campello, 2007; Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg, 2010).  This suggests that in the later 
regression analysis we should control for the potential effects of the total amount of 
the investment level and external financing by including the investment (INVEST) and 
internal cash flows (CASH).18  
 
                                                        
18 We thank an anonymous referee who points out this substantial change on total amount of external 
financing or financial deficits, INVEST and CASH during three periods.  The causes of these changes, 
however, are out of the scope of this paper.  We try to control for these potential effects on external 
financing choices, discuss the alternative explanations in the robustness tests (Section 7.3) in this paper 
and leave the other questions for further research.  We also notice that change in working capitals 
(DWC) changed over time and control it in the regression analysis. 
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[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
6.3 Regression Analysis 
Table 4 presents the regression analysis based on the Probit model of external 
financing choice by Chang et al. (2009). Panel A of Table 4 reports the within-sample 
analysis of Model (1). We start with a simple regression that only includes 
UNCORRECTEDi,t and CORRECTEDi,t. The results in Column (1) show that 
UNCORRECTEDi,t is significantly associated with a lower likelihood of issuing 
equity as opposed to debt (z=-2.83), but CORRECTEDi,t is significantly associated 
with a positive sign (z=5.16).  Without controlling for the other effects on external 
financing choices, however, it is difficult to conclude that companies vary their 
financing choices in response to internal control performance disclosure. Therefore, 
we provide the results of Model (1) with all the control variables.  As with the results 
in Column (1), Column (2) indicates that the results remain after controlling for other 
factors that affect external financing choices. Specifically, the z-statistic of the 
coefficient on UNCORRECTEDi,t is  -2.31 and that on CORRECTEDi,t is  2.92.  In 
addition, the control variables generally have the signs consistent with prior literature 
(e.g. Frank and Goyal, 2003; Chang et al., 2006, 2009).  Thus, the results of the within 
sample analysis support the conjecture that ICW companies are more likely to issue 
debt in the uncorrected period, but equity in the corrected period.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
To ensure that our findings are not affected by the omitted confounding events 
which are not considered in the within-sample analysis, we also report the results of 
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difference-in-difference analysis in Panel B of Table 4. In both Columns (1) and (2), 
the coefficients of UNCORRECTEDi,t are not significant (z=-0.44 and -0.22), but the 
coefficients of  ICWi,t *UNCORRECTEDi,t  are significant with a negative sign (z=-
3.72 and -2.13). On the other hand, both of the coefficients of CORRECTEDi,t are not 
significant either (z=1.12 and 0.98), but  those of ICWi,t*CORRECTEDi,t  are 
significantly positive (z=7.23 and 2.14).   All the above results indicate that after 
controlling for the omitted variables by using the difference-in-difference method, 
ICW companies are less likely than non-ICW companies to issue equity as opposed to 
debt after the ICW reporting, but become more likely to issue equity than non-ICW 
companies after the remediation of ICWs.  In other words, the difference-in-
difference analysis confirms that the results in Panel A are not derived from a pure 
time-series effect.  
 
7. Additional Tests 
In this section we provide the additional analysis on how different company 
characteristics affect the relationship between the disclosure on internal control over 
financial reporting and external financing choices. We also perform some robustness 
checks on our results.  
 
7.1 Company Size 
Frank and Goyal (2003) find that pecking order prediction performs 
monotonically better as firm size increases. This implies that in equilibrium small 
companies rely more on equity financing to meet their financial deficits relative to 
large companies.  Therefore, we expect that the effects on external financing choices 
27 
 
arising from the weakness of internal controls over financial reporting are more 
pronounced for small companies than for large companies.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 5 provides the results of changes in external financing choices as a 
response to changes of the opinions of the internal control reports for small and large 
companies respectively. The results reported suggest that: (i) In the UNCORRECTED 
period, both small and large companies are less likely to issue equity (z=-2.10 in 
Column 1 and -1.79 in Column 2). Although the coefficients on UNCORRECTED for 
large companies are less significant than those of small companies, their difference is 
not significant (z=0.09 in Column 3).  (ii) In the CORRECTED period, only small 
companies are more likely to issue equity (z=3.27 in Column 1 vs. z=1.45 in Column 
2 and z=2.18 in Column 3). This is partly consistent with our prediction that the 
effects of internal control over financial reporting on external financing choices are 
more pronounced for small companies than for large companies.  
 
7.2 Ex ante Probability of Internal Control Weakness 
Capital market participants rely on both public and private information when 
pricing equity or debt. Therefore, it is natural to expect that investors would form their 
own evaluation about the internal control risks of a company, and incorporate their 
assessment in response to the external financing of a company. As mentioned earlier, 
previous studies find that some company characteristics, such as size, profitability, 
complexity of operations, and growth opportunities, are  associated with the 
likelihood of material ICWs (e.g. Bryan and Lilien, 2005; Ge and McVay, 2005; 
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Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2007; Doyle et al., 2007a). Equity and debt investors are 
likely to have used the public information to form their own expectations of internal 
control risks.  These pre-pricing behaviors could presumably make these companies 
inflexible regarding the external financing choices. Therefore, the ICW disclosures by 
different companies convey various levels of new information to the market, and lead 
to various changes in the external financing choices made by the companies. Our 
prediction is that, ceteris paribus, the association in H1, (i.e. that ICW companies are 
less likely to do equity financing in UNCORRECTED period) is more pronounced for 
the companies with low ex ante probability of internal control weakness than for the 
companies with a high ex ante probability.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
Table 6 reports the estimation results of Model (1) for companies with high or 
low ex ante probability of internal control weakness. The ex ante probability of 
internal control weakness is based on Model (3) which  is same as the one  conducted  
in the propensity score matching sample procedure. The results reported in Column (1) 
are for the companies with ex ante probability of internal control weakness less than 
the sample median of the distribution; the results for the rest of the companies are 
reported in Column (2).  All companies, irrespective of whether they have a low or 
high ex ante probability, are more likely to issue equity in the CORRECTED period 
(z= 2.31in Column 1; z=2.97 in Column 2), but only companies with a low predicted 
probability of internal control weakness are less likely to issue equity in the 
UNCORRECTED period (z=-2.77 in Column 1; z=-0.97 in Column 2).  The 
difference between the coefficients of UNCORRECTED is significant at the ten 
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percent level (z=-1.89), but this is not true for the coefficients of CORRECTED (z=-
0.11). This suggests that ICW companies, with a low ex ante probability of internal 
control weakness, are less likely to do equity financing in the UNCORRECTED 
period, than companies with a high ex ante probability. This is consistent with our 
prediction.  
 
7.3 Financial Reporting Quality, Optimal Investment, and External Financing 
Choices  
 We find that investment expenditures in ICW firms tend to decrease after the 
issuance of the ICW, but increase after the correction of the ICW has occurred.  The 
previous studies find that companies with a low financial reporting quality tend to 
deviate from the optimal investment levels (Biddle and Hilary, 2006; Biddle et al., 
2009; Biddle et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2011).  We agree with these studies.   For 
example, Biddle et al. (2009) propose that information asymmetries between firms 
and suppliers of capital can reduce capital investment efficiency by giving rise to 
frictions such as moral hazard and adverse selection that can each lead to produce 
over- or under-investment.  The high financial reporting quality can reduce these 
information asymmetries and can be positively associated with investment efficiency.   
Consistent with the literature, it is possible that investment of ICW companies 
may deviate significantly from their optimal levels during the Pre-ICW period, and 
then move to relatively low levels after the issuance of ICWs.  After the correction of 
the ICWs, the optimal investment expenditure levels increase, as is consistent with a 
higher level of financial reporting quality.  The negative relationship between 
financial reporting quality and corporate investment level may affect the external 
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financing behaviors.  In our paper, we use the investment (INVEST) to control for the 
potential effects of the investment level on external financing choices.19    
It is also possible that the association between internal control performance 
(financial reporting quality) and investment efficiency may not necessarily be the 
result of information asymmetry between managers and outsiders (Chen et al., 2011).  
As McNichols and Stubben (2008) point out, investment decisions depend on the 
expectations of benefits from investment.  These benefits in turn depend on the 
expectations of future growth and product demand.  In other words, high-quality 
information can help managers form more accurate expectations and identify better 
investment opportunities, thereby improving investment efficiency even in a world 
without adverse selection and/or moral hazard (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
McNichols and Stubben, 2008).  Previous literature shows that corporate investment 
expenditures and its effects on firm value are associated with the profitability (Biddle 
et al., 2001).   If managers in firms with ineffective internal controls rely on the 
financial information generated from inaccurate or incomplete internal management 
reports when deciding on investment expenditure, we expect that the internal control 
performance would be associated with investment efficiency.  Naturally, the studies 
based on publicly listed firms cannot tell which mechanism is dominant in the 
relationship between financial reporting quality and investment efficiency.  Chen et al. 
(2011) do not perfectly deal with this puzzle even when using private firms in the US.  
Given that we cannot perfectly rule out this alternative, we use the following 
steps to mitigate the above potential effect that might influence our conclusions:  
                                                        
19 We thank an anonymous referee who suggests that we should consider this alternative explanation 
for our relationship between internal control reporting and external financing choices.  However, 
whether ICW reporting drives companies to deviate from their optimal investment level is outside the 
scope of this paper.   Therefore, we try to control for this potential effect on external financing choices 
and leave the other questions for further research. 
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First, as we show in the research design, we add corporate investment 
expenditures (INVEST) in our Models (1) and (2) to control for the general effect of  
the changes in investment on external financing choices.  Our results do not change if 
we use industry-adjusted investment, or the deviation from the optimal investment 
levels (Biddle et al., 2009).  
Second, if the association between internal control performance and 
investment efficiency is due largely to the information asymmetry between managers 
and outsiders, we expect that companies with low ex ante probability of ICWs would 
more likely under-invest in the UNCORRECTED period than in the Pre-ICW period, 
but this association is not significant for the companies with a high ex ante probability 
of ICWs.  However, if the alternative explanation is true, we do not expect this 
difference to exist between the two types of ICW companies. 
We follow Biddle et al. (2009) and define over- and under- investment by 
using the difference between corporate investment and optimal investment.   The 
untabulated results are in line with our predictions.  Specifically, companies with low 
ex ante probability of ICWs under-invest significantly more in the UNCORRECTED 
period than in the Pre-ICW period at the one percent level (z=2.79).  However, this 
result is not significant for companies with high ex ante probability of ICWs (z=1.22). 
This suggests that the ICW reporting that increases information asymmetry has 
additional explanatory power on the relationship between financial reporting quality 
and investment efficiency.  
 
8. Conclusions, Limitations and Future Research 
8.1 Summary 
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Previous studies find that ICW companies face an increase either in the cost of 
debt or in the cost of equity.  However, none of these studies has examined the net 
effect of these two costs.  Whether dynamic internal control performance over 
financial reporting affects the companies’ financing decisions is an empirical question.  
In our paper we present a model where outside shareholders have less information 
about the company and the prospect of the projects and thus require a higher premium 
to compensate for the information risk if the company has a material weakness in its 
internal control systems.  Therefore, if a company has an ICW report, it would be 
more likely to issue debt to meet its financial deficits.  On the other hand, prior 
literature shows that the quality of financial reporting is improved if the ICW 
companies correct their previously reported ICWs.  However, the investor perception 
of such an improvement is not clearly investigated.   In this paper we examine 
whether the internal controls that become effective later, affect these ICW companies’ 
financing choices in the later period.   
We find that if a company has an ICW report, it would be more likely to issue 
debt as opposed to equity.  In addition, if such a company corrects its reported ICWs, 
it would more likely revert to using equity financing.  Taken together, we provide 
evidence that (1) ICW reporting has new information for outside investors to make 
necessary adjustments to their required returns on these ICW companies; (2) ICW 
companies then change their financing choices to debt  issuance to meet the financial 
deficits; (3) Corrected internal control reporting decreases the information asymmetry 
between management and outside investors.  Therefore, the results in this paper 
support the contentions that internal control weakness reporting affects companies’ 
external financing choices and remediation of internal control weaknesses improves 
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the quality of financial reporting and restores investor confidence in the reliability of 
financial statements. 
 
8.2 Limitations and Future Research 
We recognize several limitations of our study.  First, ICW might not be a 
perfect proxy for the quality of financial reporting quality, and thus of the information 
asymmetry between managers and investors.  Second, it is more compelling to further 
decompose debt into private debt and public debt and then test the relationship 
between ICW reporting and financing choices.  This is because private debt holders, 
for example, bank loan lenders, are more likely to be insiders as opposed to public 
debt holders and equity shareholders.  Third, we find that investment expenditures in 
ICW companies tend to decrease after the issuance of the ICWs, but increase after the 
correction of the ICWs has been made.   It is not clear whether managers make bad 
decisions on corporate investment because of the weak internal control system, and 
make better decisions after the correction of the ICWs.  Through this mechanism, 
internal control performance may also affect the external financing behavior even 
where there is no  information asymmetry.  In our study, however, the focus is not on 
the relationship between investment efficiency and internal control performance.  We 
control for the investment level and do several robustness tests to mitigate the 
influence of this mechanism.  We leave this latter question for future research.   
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Appendix A: The Model on External Financing Choices 
In this appendix, we provide proof of the condition under which a company 
with high level earnings chooses equity over debt, even though it reports ICWs.  We 
calibrate the payoffs to the company in cases of both debt and equity offering. 
First, let us assume that the debt market is competitive, which means that the 
face value of debt should satisfy the following condition: F*r= I1. We further assume 
that the distress cost associated with debt financing is denoted by c.   Then the payoff 
to the company from issuing debt is: 
𝐾𝐷 = 𝑃(𝐼1 + 𝑄1 + 𝑋𝐻 − 𝐹) − (1 − 𝑃)𝑐          (A.1) 
Substituting the equation for I1 into the equation (A.1), the following result can be 
easily obtained: 
d𝐾𝐷
d𝐼1
= 𝑃 − 1 < 0                            (A.2) 
On the other hand, for the equity issuance, first assume 𝛼 to be the fraction that the 
company gives to outsiders. The break-even condition for outsiders is: 
𝛼𝑃[𝐸(𝑋,𝑝) + 𝐼1 + 𝑄1] = 𝐼1               (A.3) 
The payoff to the company is as follows: 
𝐾𝐸 = (1 − 𝛼)𝑃(𝑋𝐻 + 𝐼1 + 𝑄1)         (A.4) 
It can be shown that:     
d𝐾𝐷
d𝐼1
=< 𝑃 − 1 < 0                         (A.5) 
We show in the following graph that the payoff to the company decreases with 
the scale of the financing and that the magnitude is different: 
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Figure A.1: The Tradeoff Between Equity versus Debt 
 
In Figure A.1 above, I* is the threshold in choosing debt versus equity, which is the 
amount of investment that will make the payoff of the company from debt issuance 
equal to that from equity offering. 
 
In t=2, if the ICWs are corrected, undervaluation does not happen. Hence the 
company turns to equity financing for sure to avoid the financial distress costs 
associated with debt financing.  The derivation is similar to what we have shown 
above and is omitted for sake of space. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
I* 
I 
Payoff 
KE 
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Appendix B: Variable Definitions 
 
Variables Definitions 
  
DISSUEi,t Debt issuance of company i in year t, scaled by total assets in year t. Debt 
issuance is equal to long-term debt issuance minus long-term debt reduction 
(i.e. dltis-dltr). 
 
EISSUEi,t Equity issuance of company i in year t, scaled by total assets in year t. Equity 
issuance is equal to sale of common and preferred stock minus purchase of 
common and preferred stock (i.e. sstk-prstkc). 
 
EQFINAi,t Indicator variable that is equal to one if equity is issued, and 0 if debt is issued. 
Companies are defined as issuing equity (debt) when the net equity (debt) 
issued divided by total assets (EISSUE-DISSUE) exceeds 2 percent. 
 
DVi,t Dividend payment of company i in year t, scaled by total assets in year t.  
 
INVESTi,t Investment expenditure of company i in year t, scaled by total assets in year t. 
Investment expenditure is equal to capital expenditures + increase in 
investments + acquisitions - sale of property, plant & equipment – sale of 
investments – change in short-term investments – other investing activities (i.e. 
capx+ivch+aqc-sppe-siv-ivstch-ivaco) (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
 
DWCi,t Change in working capital of company i in year t, scaled by total assets in year 
t.  Change in working capital is equal to – change in account receivable – 
change in inventory – change in account payables – change in income taxes - 
net change in other assets and liabilities + change in cash – change in cash flow 
in other financing activities – change in current debt (i.e. -recch-invch-aoalch-
txach-aoloch+chech-fiao-dlcch) (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
 
CASHi,t Internal cash flow of company i in year t, scaled by total assets in year t.  
Internal cash flow is equal to income before extraordinary items + extraordinary 
Items and Discontinued Operations + depreciation and amortization + deferred 
taxes + equity in net loss or earnings + gain or loss on sale of property, plant & 
equipment and investments + funds from operations + exchange rate effect  (i.e. 
ibc+xidoc+dpc+txdc+esubc+sppiv+fopo+exre) (Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
 
DEFi,t  DVi,t + INVESTi,t  + DWCi,t – CASHi,t (Frank and Goyal, 2003). 
 
  
UNCORRECTEDi,t Indicator variable that is equal to one if company i is during the uncorrected 
period, starting from the date of the ICW report issuance, ending at the date of 
first effective internal control performance report, otherwise zero. 
 
CORRECTEDi,t Indicator variable that is equal to one if company i is during the corrected 
period, starting from the date of the first effective internal control performance 
report after the issuance of prior ICW report, otherwise zero. 
 
Control variables used in Model 1 and 2: 
  
ROAi,t Profitability, which is set to be earnings over total assets in year t. Earning is 
equal to operating income before depreciation (i.e. oibdp).  
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TANGi,t Tangibility, which is set to be property, plant and equipment over total assets in 
year t. Property, plant and equipment is equal to net value of total property, 
plant and equipment (i.e. ppent).  
 
SIZEi,t The natural logarithm of the total assets in year t. 
 
ZSCOREi,t This variable is calculated by the following formula: 3.3*pre-tax 
income+sale+1.4*retained earnings+1.2*(current assets-current liability) 
( Lemmon et al. 2008) 
 
MBi,t Market-to-book ratio. The market value is equal to market value of equity + 
current debt + long-term debt + preferred shares + deferred taxes and 
investment tax credit (i.e. me+dlc+dltt+pstk+txditc) in year t. The book value is 
equal to total assets in year t (Frank and Goyal, 2003).  
 
LEVi,t Leverage ratio, which is equal to book value of total debt over total assets in 
year t. Total debt is equal to the sum of current debt and long term debt (i.e. 
dlc+dltt) in year t. 
 
BIG4i,t Indicator variable that is equal to one if company i is audited by Big 4 auditor in 
year t, otherwise zero. 
 
LOGAFi,t The natural logarithm of the number of analysts making annual earnings 
forecasts in year t. 
 
RATINGi,t Indicator variable that is equal to one if either senior or subordinated debt of 
company i is rated by Standard &Poor, otherwise zero. 
 
STDEARNi,t Standard deviation (using available data during the previous ten years) of the 
ratio of EBITDA to total assets.  
 
RVOLi,t Standard deviation of monthly stock returns over last 12 months for company i 
in year t. 
 
TURNOVERi,t Median value of monthly shares traded (volume) divided by shares outstanding 
of company i over a 12-month period in year t. 
 
RETi,t Compounded annual stock return of company i over a 12-month period in year 
t. 
 
AGEi,t Number of years since the company i entered Compustat in year t. 
 
  
ICWi,t Indicator variable that is equal to one if the company reports at least one ICW 
during the sample period, and zero otherwise. 
 
Variables used in Model 3 of propensity score matching procedure: 
 
FOREIGNSALESi,t An indicator variable equal to one if the company has a non-zero foreign 
currency translation in year t, and zero otherwise. 
 
INVENTi,t Inventory divided by total assets. 
 
43 
 
RESTRUCTi,t An indicator variable equal to one if the company reports a restructuring charge 
in any of previous three years (including current year) and zero otherwise. 
 
MAi,t An indicator variable equal to one if the company has at least one merger or 
acquisition activity in any of previous three years (including current year) and 
zero otherwise. 
 
LOSSi,t An indicator variable equal to one if the company reports negative income in 
any of previous three years (including current year) and zero otherwise. 
 
SALESGROWi,t Natural logarithm of sales growth average over the past three years. 
 
NSEGi,t The total number of the operating and geographic segments of a company. 
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Situations of the 
company High level earnings(XH) Low level earnings(XL) 
ICW reporting For I<I*, Equity financing Equity financing For I≥I*, Debt financing Equity financing 
No ICW reporting Equity financing Equity financing 
 
Figure 2: Choices of Debt vs. Equity in Different Situations 
  
The company needs new 
investment I1, which will have 
a payoff of I1+Q1 in t=2 from 
the project with probability r 
and 0 with probability 1-r.  
The true earnings from assets 
in place are only known by 
the managers.  The company 
discloses ICWs in this period. 
 
The investment payoff a 
company from I1 and the 
earnings from assets in place 
are realized. With probability 
r, earnings are XH and XL with 
probability 1-r.  The company 
decides to financeI2 to finance 
another project.  The company 
remediates previously 
reported ICWs. 
 
Earnings from asset in 
place are realized.  With 
probability r, earnings 
are XH and payoff from 
the new project is 
I2+Q2.  With probability 
1-r, earnings and 
payoffs from project are 
XL and 0, respectively. 
 
t=1 t=2 t=3 
Figure1: Timeline of the Event 
Uncorrected Period Corrected Period 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Composition of ICW Companies 
This table describes the sample selection process of our initial ICW sample, 519 ICW 
companies with ineffective internal control reports under Section 404 (a) filed in the period 
2004-2009, and the characteristics of the material control weaknesses of the ICW companies. 
Panel A. Sample reconciliation 
   
Filters 
# of 
Companies # of Report-Years 
Internal control weakness reports under Section 404 (a) 3,577 5,600 
Excluding companies with weakness report under Section 
302 before 2004 1,341 2,003 
 2,236 3,597 
Excluding companies with missing data on accounting 
variables required 1,717 2,792 
Initial sample of ICW companies 519 805 
 
Panel B. Yearly distribution of ICW disclosures under Section 404 (a) 
  ICW Company Year 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total  
# of ICW Reports 136 196 147 150 103 73 805 
% of total 16.89% 24.35% 18.26% 18.63% 12.80% 9.07% 100.00% 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive Statistics of ICW and Control Companies 
This table describes the financial characteristics of the ICW companies and control 
companies. 
Panel A. Company characteristics of the initial sample of ICW companies 
Variables N Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
ROA 2861 0.054 0.194 0.028 0.091 0.147 
TANG 2861 0.241 0.217 0.073 0.169 0.342 
SIZE 2861 5.854 1.684 4.805 5.846 6.929 
ZSCORE 2820 1.243 1.329 0.159 1.284 2.349 
LEV 2861 0.199 0.232 0.003 0.141 0.305 
MB 2594 1.959 1.755 1.105 1.453 2.128 
DV 2861 0.006 0.020 0.000 0.000 0.003 
DWC 2861 0.015 0.141 -0.030 0.018 0.070 
INVEST 2861 0.053 0.130 0.010 0.044 0.105 
CASH 2861 0.047 0.174 0.027 0.076 0.127 
BIG4 2861 0.720 0.448 0.000 1.000 1.000 
LOGAF 2861 2.685 1.587 1.609 3.135 3.912 
RATING 2861 0.249 0.432 0.000 0.000 0.000 
RVOL 2594 0.152 0.089 0.092 0.129 0.185 
STDEARN 2861 0.119 0.195 0.036 0.064 0.122 
TURNOVER 2683 1.736 1.561 0.584 1.286 2.367 
RET 2683 -0.037 0.622 -0.333 0.013 0.318 
AGE 2861 2.962 0.575 2.564 2.890 3.433 
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TABLE 2 (Cont’d) 
Panel B. Propensity score matching:  
summary statistics separately for ICW companies and control companies 
  
ICW companies 
(2,476 company-
years) 
Non-ICW companies 
(2,476 company-
years) 
Diff. in 
means 
Diff. in 
medians 
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
  SIZE 5.855 5.847 5.841 5.899 0.014 -0.052 
AGE 2.989 2.890 3.015 2.931 -0.026 -0.041 
FOREIGNSALES 0.348 0.000 0.347 0.000 0.001 0.000 
INVENT 0.094 0.102 0.100 0.111 -0.006 -0.009 
MA 0.902 1.000 0.893 1.000 0.009 0.000 
RESTRUCT 0.689 1.000 0.687 1.000 0.002 0.000 
LOSS 0.864 1.000 0.869 1.000 -0.005 0.000 
ZSCORE 1.243 1.201 1.223 1.192 0.020 0.009 
SALESGROW 0.099 0.078 0.084 0.060 0.015* 0.018* 
NSEG 6.916 6.000 6.879 6.000 0.037 0.000 
ROA 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.061 0.001 -0.002 
The propensity score is generated from a prediction model with the dependent variable being 
ICW and the explanatory variables SIZE, AGE, FOREIGNSALES, INVENT, MA, RESTRUCT, 
LOSS, ZSCORE, SALESGROW, NSEG, and ROA. The prediction model is as followed: 
 
P[ICWi,t=1]=c0 + c1SIZEi,t-1 + c2AGEi,t-1 + c3 FOREIGNSALESi,t-1 + c4INVENTi,t-1 + c5MAi,t-1 + 
c6RESTRUCTi,t-1 + c7LOSSi,t-1 + c8ZSCOREi,t-1 + c9SALESGROWi,t-1 + c10NSEGi,t-1 + c11ROAi,t-1 
+ εi,t   (Model 3) 
 
All of the above variables are defined in Appendix B. All of the continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Differences that are significant at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  Difference in 
means (median) between ICW companies and non-ICW companies are based on the t-tests 
(the Wilcoxon rank sum tests). 
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TABLE 3 
Financial Deficits of ICW Companies 
This table describes the decomposition of corporate cash flows of ICW companies. 
DEFi,t  is financial deficit for company i in year t, deflated by total assets at the end of year t.  
Financial deficit for company i in year t is equal to the sum of dividend payment (DV), 
change in working capital (DWC) and investment (INVEST) for company i in year t, minus 
internal cash flow (CASH) for company i in year t.  EISSUEi,t  is net equity issued for 
company i in year t. DISSUEi,t  is net debt  issued for company i in year t. EISSUEi,t  + 
DISSUEi,t  is total external financing for company i in year t.  All of the above variables are 
defined in Appendix B.  All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.   
Average number as a 
fraction 
of total assets 
2004-2009 
Pre-ICW UNCORRECTED CORRECTED 
# of obs. Mean # of obs. Mean # of obs. Mean 
Cash dividends (DV) 1,083 0.005 799 0.005 979 0.006 
Investments (INVEST) 1,083 0.059 799 0.048 979 0.060 
Change in working capital 
(DWC) 1,083 0.010 799 0.013 979 0.016 
Internal cash flow (CASH) 1,083 0.039 799 0.047 979 0.053 
Financial deficit (DEF) 1,083 0.035 799 0.019 979 0.029 
Net equity issues (EISSUE) 1,083 0.023 799 0.005 979 0.020 
Net debt issues (DISSUE) 1,083 0.012 799 0.014 979 0.009 
Total external financing  
(EISSUE+DISSUE) 1,083 0.035 799 0.019 979 0.029 
% of Equity financing 
 
65.71% 
 
35.71% 
 
68.97% 
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TABLE 4 
The Effect of Internal Control Performance on External Financing Choices 
This table reports the changes of external financing choices in response to the changes of the 
opinions of the internal control reports.  
Panel A. Within-sample analysis of equity issuance of ICW companies 
This Panel reports the estimation results of the following regression model, 
P[EQFINAi,t=1]=a0 + a1UNCORRECTEDi,t + a2CORRECTEDi,t + a3 ROAi,t-1 + a4TANGi,t-1 
+ a5SIZEi,t-1 + a6ZSCOREi,t-1 + a7LEVi,t-1 + a8MBi,t-1 + a9DVi,t + a10DWCi,t 
+ a11INVESTi,t + a12CASHi,t + a13BIG4i,t-1 +  a14LOGAFi,t-1 +  
a15RATINGi,t-1 +    a16 STDEARNi,t-1  + a17 RVOLi,t-1 +  a18TURNOVERi,t-1 
+  a19RETi,t-1 +   a20AGEi,t-1 + εi,t   (Model 1) 
The dependent variable, EQFINA, equals 1 if equity is issued, and 0 if debt is issued. 
Companies are defined as issuing equity (debt) when the net equity (debt) issued divided by 
total assets (EISSUE-DISSUE) exceeds 2 percent.  Control variables include ROA, TANG, 
SIZE, ZSCORE, LEV, MB, DV, DWC, INVEST, CASH, BIG4, LOGAF, RATING, RVOL, 
STDEARN, TURNOVER, RET, AGE. All of these control variables are defined in Appendix 
B.  All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Coefficients 
on SIC 2-digit industry, and year fixed effects are suppressed but not tabulated. Standard 
errors are clustered by company and year. Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Within-Sample 
 
(1) 
Without Control Variables 
(2) 
With Control Variables 
 Coeff. Z-Stat. Coeff. Z-Stat. 
UNCORRECTED -0.150*** (-2.83) -0.111*** (-2.31) 
CORRECTED 0.410*** (5.16) 0.284*** (2.92) 
ROA 
  
-0.277* (-1.99) 
TANG 
  
-0.565*** (-2.82) 
SIZE 
  
-0.226*** (-6.04) 
ZSCORE 
  
-0.014 (-1.44) 
LEV 
  
0.410*** (3.63) 
MB 
  
0.016** (2.10) 
DV 
  
-0.898 (-0.63) 
DWC 
  
1.772*** (3.91) 
INVEST 
  
1.251*** (4.90) 
CASH 
  
-1.597*** (-4.05) 
BIG4 
  
0.042 (1.24) 
LOGAF 
  
0.051** (2.27) 
RATING 
  
-0.115** (-2.20) 
STDEARN 
  
0.089** (2.20) 
RVOL 
  
0.467* (1.89) 
TURNOVER 
  
0.145*** (5.23) 
RET 
  
0.345*** (5.28) 
AGE 
  
-0.099* (-1.97) 
Number of Obs. 2,774 2,573 
Pseudo R2 0.0921 0.2329 
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TABLE 4 (Cont’d) 
Panel B. Regression analyses of equity issuance with control sample 
This Panel reports the estimation results of the following regression model, 
P[EQFINAi,t=1] = b0 + b1ICWi,t + b2ICWi,t*UNCORRECTEDi,t +  b3ICWi,t*CORRECTEDi,t  
+ b4 Controls + εi,t     (Model 2)   
The dependent variable, EQFINA, equals 1 if equity is issued, and 0 if debt is issued. 
Companies are defined as issuing equity (debt) when the net equity (debt) issued divided by 
total assets (EISSUE-DISSUE) exceeds 2 percent.  Control variables include ROA, TANG, 
SIZE, ZSCORE, LEV, MB, DV, DWC, INVEST, CASH, BIG4, LOGAF, RATING, RVOL, 
STDEARN, TURNOVER, RET, AGE. All of these control variables are defined in Appendix 
B. All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Coefficients 
on SIC 2-digit industry, and year fixed effects are suppressed but not tabulated. Standard 
errors are clustered by company and year. Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively. 
 
Difference-in-difference 
 
(1) 
Without Control Variables 
(2) 
With Control Variables 
 Coeff. Z-Stat. Coeff. Z-Stat. 
ICW -0.077 (-1.43) -0.044 (-0.94) 
UNCORRECTED -0.031 (-0.44) -0.010 (-0.22) 
CORRECTED 0.068 (1.12) 0.053 (0.98) 
ICW*UNCORRECTED -0.175*** (-3.72) -0.136** (-2.13) 
ICW*CORRECTED 0.222*** (7.23) 0.167** (2.14) 
ROA 
  
-0.731*** (-2.33) 
TANG 
  
-0.335* (-1.91) 
SIZE 
  
-0.226*** (-9.27) 
ZSCORE 
  
-0.006 (-0.97) 
LEV 
  
0.390** (2.19) 
MB 
  
0.016*** (6.15) 
DV 
  
0.162 (0.01) 
DWC 
  
1.621*** (5.17) 
INVEST 
  
1.000*** (4.83) 
CASH 
  
-1.309*** (-4.33) 
BIG4 
  
0.005 (1.08) 
LOGAF 
  
0.087** (3.44) 
RATING 
  
-0.045 (-1.08) 
STDEARN 
  
0.099*** (2.97) 
RVOL 
  
0.873* (1.80) 
TURNOVER 
  
0.137*** (5.26) 
RET 
  
0.424*** (4.36) 
AGE 
  
-0.044 (-0.81) 
Number of Obs. 4,952 4,639 
Pseudo R2 0.1034 0.2701 
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TABLE 5 
Firm Size and External Financing Choices 
This table reports the changes of external financing choices in response to the changes of the 
opinions of the internal control reports for small and large companies respectively.  
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression model, 
P[EQFINAi,t=1]=a0 + a1UNCORRECTEDi,t + a2CORRECTEDi,t + a3 ROAi,t-1 + a4TANGi,t-1 
+ a5SIZEi,t-1 + a6ZSCOREi,t-1 + a7LEVi,t-1 + a8MBi,t-1 + a9DVi,t + a10DWCi,t 
+ a11INVESTi,t + a12CASHi,t + a13BIG4i,t-1 +  a14LOGAFi,t-1 +  
a15RATINGi,t-1 +    a16 STDEARNi,t-1  + a17 RVOLi,t-1 +  a18TURNOVERi,t-1 
+  a19RETi,t-1 +   a20AGEi,t-1 + εi,t   (Model 1) 
Small-company group contains companies with the natural logarithm of the total assets in 
year t-1 less than the annual median of the distribution. Large-company group contains 
companies with the natural logarithm of the total assets in year t-1 greater than the annual 
median of the distribution.  The dependent variable, EQFINA, equals 1 if equity is issued, and 
0 if debt is issued. Companies are defined as issuing equity (debt) when the net equity (debt) 
issued divided by total assets (EISSUE-DISSUE) exceeds 2 percent.  Control variables include 
ROA, TANG, SIZE, ZSCORE, LEV, MB, DV, DWC, INVEST, CASH, BIG4, LOGAF, 
RATING, RVOL, STDEARN, TURNOVER, RET, AGE. All of these control variables are 
defined in Appendix B.  All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles.  Coefficients on SIC 2-digit industry, and year fixed effects are suppressed but 
not tabulated. Standard errors are clustered by company and year. Coefficients that are 
significant at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent level are marked with *, **, and ***, 
respectively. 
  Within-Sample 
  
(1) 
Small Companies 
(2) 
Large Companies 
(3) 
Differences  
between (2) and (1) 
 
Coeff. Z-Stat. Coeff. Z-Stat. Coeff. Z-Stat. 
UNCORRECT
ED -0.105** (-2.10) -0.115* (-1.79) 0.010 (0.09) 
CORRECTED 0.435*** (3.27) 0.299 (1.45) 0.136** (2.18) 
Controls Yes Yes 
 Number of 
Obs. 1,279 1,247 
 Pseudo R2 0.2606 0.2490 
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TABLE 6 
Ex Ante Probability of ICWs and External Financing Choices 
This table reports the changes of external financing choices in response to the changes of the 
opinions of the internal control reports for companies with low ex ante probability of internal 
control weakness and companies with high probability respectively.  
This table reports the estimation results of the following regression model, 
P[EQFINAi,t=1]=a0 + a1UNCORRECTEDi,t + a2CORRECTEDi,t + a3 ROAi,t-1 + a4TANGi,t-1 
+ a5SIZEi,t-1 + a6ZSCOREi,t-1 + a7LEVi,t-1 + a8MBi,t-1 + a9DVi,t + a10DWCi,t 
+ a11INVESTi,t + a12CASHi,t + a13BIG4i,t-1 +  a14LOGAFi,t-1 +  
a15RATINGi,t-1 +    a16 STDEARNi,t-1  + a17 RVOLi,t-1 +  a18TURNOVERi,t-1 
+  a19RETi,t-1 +   a20AGEi,t-1 + εi,t   (Model 1) 
The dependent variable, EQFINA, equals 1 if equity is issued, and 0 if debt is issued. 
Companies are defined as issuing equity (debt) when the net equity (debt) issued divided by 
total assets (EISSUE-DISSUE) exceeds 2 percent.  Control variables include ROA, TANG, 
SIZE, ZSCORE, LEV, MB, DV, DWC, INVEST, CASH, BIG4, LOGAF, RATING, RVOL, 
STDEARN, TURNOVER, RET, AGE. All these control variables are defined in Appendix B. 
Low ex ante probability of ICW company group contains companies with the predicted 
probability that is less than the sample median of the distribution. High ex ante probability of 
ICW company group contains companies with the predicted probability that is greater than 
the sample median of the distribution. The ex-ante probability of ICW is estimated by the 
following regression model:  
P[ICWi,t=1]=c0 + c1SIZEi,t-1 + c2AGEi,t-1 + c3 FOREIGNSALESi,t-1 + c4INVENTi,t-1 + c5MAi,t-
1 + c6RESTRUCTi,t-1 + c7LOSSi,t-1 + c8ZSCOREi,t-1 + c9SALESGROWi,t-1 + 
c10NSEGi,t-1 + c11ROAi,t-1 + εi,t   (Model 3) 
We use SIZE, AGE, FOREIGNSALES, INVENT, MA, RESTRUCT, LOSS, ZSCORE, 
SALESGROW, NSEG, and ROA as the predictors of internal control weakness over financial 
reporting. All of the above variables are defined in Appendix B.  
All of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles.  Coefficients on 
SIC 2-digit industry, and year fixed effects are suppressed but not tabulated. Standard errors 
are clustered by company and year. Coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent, 5 
percent, and 1 percent level are marked with *, **, and ***, respectively.  
  Within-Sample 
  
(1) 
Low Probability 
(2) 
High Probability 
(3) 
Differences  
between (2) and (1) 
 
Coeff. Z-Stat. Coeff. Z-Stat. Coeff. Z-Stat. 
UNCORRECTE
D -0.205*** (-2.77) -0.077 (-0.97) -0.128* (-1.89) 
CORRECTED 0.419** (2.31) 0.425*** (2.97) -0.006 (-0.11) 
Controls Yes Yes 
 Number of Obs. 1,272 1,233 
 Pseudo R2 0.2473 0.1954 
 
 
